Following the Hamas suicide bombing of Bus #5 on Dizengoff Street in October 1994, Nahum Barnea, one of the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot's leading analysts, stated an unusually bleak outlook on the event: "Rabin has no solution to the problem of Hamas. The army also has no solution. All of the grand acts of revenge being discussed -- mass expulsions, army action in Gaza, a massive operation in Lebanon -- were summarily rejected yesterday. They have no real benefit, except perhaps to satisfy a temporary craving in the public mind. That is the bitter truth. Rabin knew that already in London. He came back and heard it from his people. . . He knows there is no reply for the moment to Hamas terror. . ." (Yediot Ahronot. October 21, 1994. Page 1, section B).

Giving the accuracy of Barnea's outlook the benefit of the doubt, and barring an unmitigated Israeli military response to Hamas, this statement begged the question: What was the proper political response to Hamas? What could be done through normal democratic political channels to apply pressure on the Hamas organization, and compel it to cease its policy of wanton murder and terror?

In Israel per se, normal political options for dealing with Hamas were and still are nonexistent. The Hamas charter, a 30-page document published in August 1988, is a monument of unalloyed Islamic hostility toward the Jewish State; fanatically unbending in its aim of returning "Palestine" to its "rightful" status as an Islamic Waqf (religious trust), through violence. "The ownership of the land by its owners is only one of usufruct, and this Waqf will endure as long as Heaven and earth last. Any demarche in violation of this law of Islam, with regard to Palestine, is baseless and reflects on its perpetrators" (The Covenant of HAMAS, August 1988, Article Eleven, Page 7). Whereas for years, voices on the left in Israeli politics called for dialogue with the PLO, no one in his right mind has made similar pleas where Hamas is concerned, then or now.

On account of the paradoxical obstacles that have always prevented unrestrained military or even modest political solutions to the Hamas problem in Israel, the situation surely required the organization and implementation of aggressive strategies on the part of Israel's supporters in America. Articulate leaders and spokesmen should have rallied people to oppose Hamas and Islamic Terror, as they once did against the PLO and Palestinian Terror. Tough legislation prohibiting Hamas members from crossing US borders to raise needed support here for their murderous aims should have been high on the agenda in Washington, as it once was in the days when the US Congress outlawed PLO members as terrorists. The bitter ideological conflict between Hamas and its charter based on total submission to Islamic "Sharia" vs. Israeli Western-style democracy should have created a storm of debate and controversy in the public arena. Arguments pro and con should have been circulating and creating controversy, as was the case when the spotlight was on the PLO and its oft-proclaimed raison d'être (i.e. Israel's destruction).

So, why, in the mid 1990s, at one of the peaks of Hamas terror in Israel was there such perplexing silence? Why was there such inaction and disinterest here about Hamas and Islamic Terror, generally? One reason perhaps, is that Hamas leader Sheikh Yasin's circle of influence has always been confined strictly to Gaza and the West Bank, whereas Yasser Arafat, on the other hand, always fought to expand his circle and be recognized as a world figure in the fight for "Palestinian" rights. Arafat's wider recognition, alone, and the constant churning of the well-oiled PLO public relations and propaganda apparatus worldwide ensured that the controversy between Israel and the PLO would always have its day in the sun -- practically every day. And when Arab terrorists took part in murderous operations like jet hijackings and so on, their aim in terms of riveting world public attention was achieved. Widespread vocal reactions to PLO terror always followed every act of terror, and kept the air of controversy surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict constantly stirring.

Hamas, for its part, has no high key public profile whatsoever, no international press offices, no recognized figure (like Arafat) beating its drum in public. Hamas is known solely for its brutal and fanatic acts of violence against Israelis, and its adherence to Extremist Islam. Such a profile, married as it often is, to the boyish, even pious, faces of their 20-year-old suicide bombers, does not lend itself easily to debate or controversy. Moreover, the shock of the mass murders they commit is such that it even disperses bitter, hard-core hatred from the average mind. For the most part here in America, Jews and non-Jews alike generally don't want to know or focus too much on Hamas, precisely because people are terrorized by the vicious murders and suicide attacks which have become their stock in trade. The repeated acts of brutality have alienated people; made them uncomfortable with the idea of addressing Hamas with all seriousness in public.

Such was never the case with the PLO. The PLO and Arafat were always generously dished out as food for thought and open argument in their day. People always took sides in discussing the problem Arafat and the PLO represented. In the case of Hamas, and Islamic Terror generally, however, people have been averting their eyes. In the case of Islamic Terror, in the ‘90s and also now, in other words, the only flag the "Palestinian" terrorists are waving is terror. Their objective has nothing to do with international diplomacy or anything of the sort. Hamas would not dream of obtaining United Nations Observer Status, for instance. Terror is their only stock in trade, not public relations. And the aim of terror per se is to silence people.

The Islamic Terrorists are achieving that objective, unfortunately, here in America. One might say they started the process by murdering Rabbi Meir Kahane, z'l. The Muslim fanatics from New Jersey who murdered him surely knew what they were doing. They wanted his big mouth out of the picture and assumed there was no one who would step into his shoes as an aggressive molder of public opinion against murderers of Jews. Until now, they seem to have called the shots correctly. No one in a position of authority has emerged who takes rhetorical aim at Arab violence, with such deadly precision, as Rabbi Kahane did.

The ongoing threat of Hamas terror has touched every soul in Israel. Moreover, in terms of sheer terror, Hamas is surely as formidable an operator as the PLO, and deserving as much aggressive opposition here among Israel supporters as was devoted against the PLO in its day. But despite the terrible cost in Jewish blood shed with impunity by Hamas in the last period, (Scores of Israelis have been killed in dozens of attacks since the signing of the Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization accord in September 1993.) and the urgent need for some coordinated political effort to crush ongoing Hamas activities here in the U.S., there was no organizing of protest demonstrations, no sharp polemical attacks, or any ratified legislation. The problem was met with practically nothing but silence and the most perplexing inertia.

There was actually one anti-Hamas assault on the legislative front; a bill (H.R. 1279) proposed by Florida Democrat Peter Deutsch in the House of Representatives in March 1993, just after the World Trade Center bombing. In brief, the bill called for amending the Immigration and Nationality Act, by adding at the end of the section on terrorist activities the following language: "An alien who is a member, officer, official representative, or spokesperson of Hamas (commonly known as the Islamic Resistance Movement) is considered for purposes of this Act, to be engaged in terrorist activity." Members of Hamas would thereby be ineligible to receive visas and excluded from admission to the U.S. In his testimony about the bill before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration and Refugees in February 1993, Deutsch stated among other things, "Beginning with the 1992 State Department report 'Patterns of Global Terrorism,' the United States officially recognized Hamas as a terrorist organization. In addition, Iran who is cited in the same report as the 'world's principle sponsor of extremist Palestinian and Islamic groups, providing them with funds, weapons, and training,' is known to provide Hamas with anywhere between $15 - $20 million per year. This is a large portion of the Hamas budget the balance of which is raised abroad. . . ."

In February, 1994 there was a subsequent hearing on Deutsch's important bill in the House Judiciary Subcommittee. A superficial item from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, which appeared in a handful of local Jewish papers, was the only clue about the hearing the Jewish community received last year. So, it was more than likely that the vast majority of Jews in America never heard anything about Deutsch's proposed anti-Hamas bill, and had no information on which to base an opinion about it. The tiny JTA story, also mentioned, in two words, that the State Department representative who testified about the bill expressed opposition to it! In her full testimony, State Department representative Mary Ryan, about H.R. 1279, February 23, 1994, 10:00 a.m., in the House Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration and Refugees, enumerated the reasons for the State Department's opposition.

First, Ryan pointed out, "Prior to the revision of the grounds of exclusion by the Immigration Act of 1990, mere membership in a terrorist organization did constitute a ground of exclusion under section 212(a)(28)(F) of the Act. . . ." It would appear, therefore, that the tough U.S. laws barring members of terrorist organizations, like the PLO, had undergone fundamental alterations since 1990. Ryan went to explain: "Beginning in 1977, with the enactment of the McGovern Amendment the Congress began a move away from exclusion by reason of mere membership or affiliation. In the early 1980s there arose much public and Congressional concern over, and criticism of what were referred to as 'ideological exclusions.' After a number of years of intense scrutiny of the subject and anguished controversy, the Congress working with the Executive Branch revised the 'ideological exclusion' grounds. The proponents of the revision were determined to eliminate from our immigration law excludabililty because of membership, affiliation statements or beliefs. . . ."

So, in place of the blanket prohibition against membership in a terrorist organization, the new provision, as Ryan proceeded to elaborate, only covers aliens who have actually perpetrated terrorist acts or participated in them to some measure: "Section 212(a)(3)(B) provides for the exclusion of aliens who have engaged in terrorist acts in the past or intend to do so in the United States. As part of the effort to avoid exclusions because of memberships affiliations beliefs or statements, the proponents of change included definitions both of 'terrorist act' and of 'engaging in.' These definitions may or may not be perfect, but they show a clear intent to apply the exclusion only to the actual perpetration of terrorist acts or to actions taken in furtherance of the perpetration of such acts."

Thus, the scene was set specifically for the State Department position on the new anti-Hamas bill, H.R. 1279 itself: "H.R. 1279 provides that 'an alien who is a member, officer, official, representative or spokesperson' of Hamas. . . is considered (for purposes of the terrorist exclusion) to be engaged in terrorist activity. It tracks the wording of the existing provision concerning the PLO, except that it also encompasses members. Consistent with the structure of the terrorist provision and the way in which the PLO provision is applied, the effect of this provision would be to make all aliens who are current members/officers representatives and spokespersons of Hamas excludable."

Surely, from the point of view of anyone who knows anything about Hamas violence against Jews, the aim of the bill, as described above by Ryan, was a desirable objective. In the year following signing of the Oslo Accords in Washington D.C. (from September 1993 through September 1994) more Israelis, civilians and soldiers alike, fell victim to terrorist murder than in any previous year in Israeli history. Some 60 Israelis were murdered in the year following Oslo, and none other than Hamas was responsible for that horrid record of atrocities.

Since September 1994, sadly, the toll only increased, and the hands of Hamas are even redder with Jewish blood. But, it would appear that the State Department is not swayed by such data: "Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, devotes extensive human and financial resources to its widespread social and welfare programs. Hamas provides Palestinians in the occupied territories with economic assistance, health care, and education. Given this structure, we do not believe that every Hamas member can be reasonably presumed personally to have participated in or assisted in the commission of terrorist activities. Thus we oppose this provision as long as the word 'member' is included. We do not otherwise object to the provision however."

As shocking as the above State Department position on Hamas might be, it is perhaps even more shocking that at the time and to this day no one in a position of authority in the Jewish world made any attempt whatsoever to correct the damaging impression conveyed by the State Department's Ryan. Nobody raised a finger in opposition to the State Department's sophistry, exonerating Hamas. Judging from Ryan's testimony, it would seem the State Department simply did not view Hamas as a band of Jew-murdering terrorists. According to the State Department Hamas is really just involved in local charity and welfare programs, like UNRWA.

The riddle of silence in this case also extends back to Deutsch. At the end of October 1994, following the Hamas suicide bombing on Dizengoff Street it seemed that there could not be a more fruitful occasion to promote a tough anti-Hamas bill in public here. Since people hated Hamas, surely, even more following the atrocity in Tel Aviv. So, voters would love (and vote for) a politician who vociferously supported a measure that would harm Hamas.

So, this writer contacted Deutsch's office in Washington D.C. to appeal for Deutsch to be vociferous about his anti-Hamas bill in his ongoing campaign for re-election in Florida. The Press Secretary understood athe request. But he disagreed about passing on the suggestion to Deutsch. "We have a comfortable lead in the campaign," he said, "and don't want to rock the boat. . . ." When asked why there had been practically no publicity or public support for Deutsch's potentially valuable legislation, the press secretary chuckled and said it was on account of the Immigration Reform Subcommittee Chair, Romano Mazzoli (D-Ky) and was leaving the committee, so he didn’t care what happened. . . . The press liaison did stress however that Rep. Deutsch "still believed it was a good idea."

He also advised this writer to get in touch with the office of Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla). McCollum, he said, had a "Terrorism Caucus" that specialized in research and held seminars and so forth. The press secretary also suggested that Vaughn Forest, McCollum's Chief of Staff, could explain where things stood vis-à-vis Deutsch's legislation and so on. But this writer never received a reply to that letter of inquiry.

Since this writer never heard about such a thing as a "Terrorism Caucus," an inquiry was made to AIPAC in Washington D.C. Their Congressional liaison said that McCollum's "Terrorism Caucus" did do research and did hold seminars, but it wasn’t a "real caucus," which is to say, it didn’t propose or fight for legislation. It was McCollum's pet project, more or less. It had no teeth.

This writer was told after the election in Florida that Deutsch never mentioned a word about his courageous sponsorship of the anti-Hamas bill. There were never any further hearings on his bill. No one was interested in raising awareness about the bill anywhere in the community, and the bill just died.

The anti-Hamas legislative approach that seemed to be the object of lobbying efforts in the mid-1990s relates to an adaptation of the well-known RICO (Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization) statutes into TICO (Terrorist Influenced Corrupt Organization) statutes. The passing of TICO laws would presumably have enabled the FBI to investigate Hamas front organizations (like the UASR "United Association for Studies and Research" in Springfield, Va.), which masquerade under banal titles as charities etc., and presumably charge them with criminal involvement and complicity in terrorism upon accumulation of evidence. But even that sort of legislation was never passed.

The fact is, even that experimental financial approach to cracking down on the estimated 30 terrorist organizations whose offices are spread around the nation was kept quiet. One Jewish leader in a position of high influence adamantly refused to disclose to this writer the details of the legislative package on which he was working. He claimed he had made a "commitment" and was not at liberty to discuss the matter.

So, despite their continuing string of bloody atrocities, Hamas and the other Islamic Terror cells successfully eluded becoming the focus of controversy or legislative opposition. There seemed to be nothing to catalyse intelligent arguments about them, no two sides (pro vs. con) that might make a public issue or forum for debate. Average people and leadership types alike were reticent about knowing or saying too much about this difficult problem.

Jonathan Silverman can be contacted by e-mail.